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One of the objectives of the Takeover Directive is to reinforce the single market by enabling 
the free movement of capital throughout the EU.  This requires takeover rules to be in 
harmony with capital movement rules, yet both 2007 and 2012 European Commission reports 
reveal a continuing tension.  Whilst Article 63 TFEU prohibits obstacles to free movement of 
capital, Article 12 of the Directive makes the removal of obstacles that would frustrate 
takeover bids optional.  In order to harmonise takeovers with free movement of capital, this 
paper examines the extent to which the tension between capital movement and takeover rules 
could potentially be resolved with negative integration.  The conclusion is that negative 
integration could resolve tension. However, the suggestion is made that strict negative 
integration is inadvisable since there seems to be a lack of political will in member states to 




This paper examines the means by which Article 12 of the Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Directive”) can be harmonised with Article 63 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  It argues that the essence of the Directive is 
to facilitate the aim of the TFEU, which is to create an internal market as an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of capital is ensured.
1
  The Directive would aid 
the free movement of capital by providing rules that ‘prevent patterns of corporate 
restructuring within the Community from being distorted by arbitrary differences in 
governance and management cultures.’2  Article 63 of the TFEU prohibits all restrictions on 
the free movement of capital; Article 9 of the Directive prohibits actions that would frustrate 
takeover bids; nevertheless, Article 12 of the Directive makes Article 9 optional.  In order to 
harmonise takeovers with free movement of capital, this paper examines the extent to which 
the tension between capital movement and takeover rules might be resolved by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the “Court”).  Whilst this paper 
argues for negative integration to resolve the tension, it also suggests that strict negative 
integration is inadvisable since there seems to be a lack of political will in member states to 
eliminate takeover obstacles and an uncertain economic situation in the EU at present. 
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1
 Article 26 of TFEU (Ex Article 14 TEC). 
2
 Recital 3, Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover 
bids, Official Journal L142/12.  The Takeover Directive is based on Article 50 of TFEU (ex Article 44 TEC). 
 This paper focuses on the free movement of capital and not freedom of establishment.  
Although among the four EU law freedoms
3
 freedom of establishment and free movement of 
capital are the most relevant freedoms to company law, the latter is more important in the 
case of takeovers.  The applicability of freedom of establishment to takeovers may often be 
seen to have been infringed when a takeover bidder has found it difficult to ‘establish’ him- 
or herself through takeovers of companies situated in another Member State.  Nevertheless, 
the applicability of free movement of capital does not depend on the takeover bidder seeking 
to become established abroad, but it is relevant when a potential investor wishes to invest in 
company shares in another Member State.
4
  Whilst Article 12 of the Directive makes both 
Articles 9 and 11 optional, either option being capable of creating tension between takeovers 
and TFEU provisions, this paper focuses on Article 9.  In some Member States such as the 
UK, opting out of Article 11, which prohibits restrictions on share transfers, has a very 
limited effect on the free movement of capital, as the UK listing rules prevent listed 
companies from restricting the sale of shares.
5
  This explains why this paper does not also 
consider freedom of establishment, Article 49 TFEU, and the breakthrough rule set out in 
Article 11 of the Directive. 
 One of the core provisions of the Directive is Article 9.  This provides for Board 
neutrality during a takeover bid so as to prevent distorting patterns of corporate restructuring 
from occurring.  Due to disagreements in the run-up to the adoption of the Directive, this core 
provision was made optional but this attracted negative criticism.  In the UK, the then 
Chairman of the Takeover Panel concluded that the Directive ‘is hardly a triumph for 
harmonisation since the contentious areas remain a matter for Member States to decide for 
themselves’;6 further, Eilis Ferran concluded that the Directive ‘is an embarrassment for the 
EU: as much time and effort was spent to achieve so little’.7  In its 2007 review of the 
implementation of the Directive, in reference to a number of Member States that have opted 
out of Article 9 of the Directive, the Commission found that ‘a large number of Member 
States have shown strong reluctance to lift takeover barriers.’8  In its 2012 review of the 
application of the Directive, the Commission found that 19 Member States have transposed 
Article 9, with 13 of those 19 Member States applying the reciprocity rule;
9
 the findings of 
which hardly represent a ‘success’ for Article 9, as only 6 Member States have opted in to 
Article 9.  The Directive’s optionality has resulted in Member States’ takeover rules being 
located somewhat further away from the Commission’s ideal of a comprehensive mandatory 
board neutrality rule than was the case before the Directive was introduced.
10
 
 Article 12 of the Directive, which allows Member States to opt in or out of Article 9, 
effectively weakened the Directive and consequently made it incapable of effectively 
preventing patterns of corporate restructuring from being distorted.  Optionality creates both 
differential applications of the Directive and obstacles to takeovers in the EU.  Such an 
                                                 
3
 See C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
4
 W.G. Ringe, “Company law and free movement of capital” (2010) 69 Cambridge Law Journal 378, 381. 
5
 See G. Morse, Charlesworth’s Company Law, 17th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) 223. 
6
 P. Scott, “The Takeover Panel Report on the year ended 31 March 2004” (London: The Takeover Panel, 2004) 
8. 
7
 E. Ferran, Building EU Securities Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 117. 
8
 European Commission, “Report on the implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids” (Brussels, 21 
February 2007) SEC(2007) 268, paragraph 3. 
9
 European Commission, “Report on the application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids” (Brussels, 28 
June 2012) COM(2012) 347 final, paragraph 7. 
10
 P. Davies, E.P. Schuster and E. van de Walle de Ghelcke, “The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?” 
in U. Bernitz and W.G. Ringe (eds), Company Law and Economic protectionism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 105, 152. 
‘optionality device ends up setting forth (or, better, tolerating) a Babel-like system for 
takeover defences around the various national legislations.’11  Legal certainty is weakened by 
the reciprocity provision in Article 12(3), which allows companies in Member States that 
have opted in or out of Article 9 to change their decision when faced with a bidder who is not 
subject to the same rules. 
 The impact of accepting the Directive without Article 9 is that the Directive fails to 
meet its objective which is to facilitate corporate restructuring by removing takeover barriers.  
As a result of opting out of Article 9 of the Directive, as assessed by the Commission in its 
2007 review, ‘there is a risk that the Board neutrality rule, as implemented in Member States 
will hold back the emergence of a European market for corporate control, rather than 
facilitate it.’12  With its aiming to make takeover safeguards uniform throughout the EU,13 
and to prevent patterns of corporate restructuring within the EU from being distorted by 
arbitrary differences in governance and management cultures (thereby removing barriers to 
takeovers),
14
 the Directive intended to  liberalise the market for corporate control.  However, 
given the range of exemptions available and the current antipathy to hostile takeover activity 




 This paper explores the effect of allowing Members States to opt out of Article 9 of 
the Directive and thereby creating barriers to takeovers, in the light of Article 63 of the 
TFEU.  The ‘acquisition of shares in a company incorporated in a Member State is covered 
by’ Article 63 of the TFEU, ‘and any restrictions on such an acquisition are prohibited.’16  It 
argues that the creation of obstacles to takeovers undermines the free movement of capital.  
Free movement of capital for the purpose of Art 63(1) TFEU includes, in particular, 
investments in the form of a shareholding which confers the possibility of effective 
participation in the management and control of an undertaking (‘direct investment’) and the 
acquisition of shares on the capital market solely with the intention of making a financial 
investment without any intention to influence its management and control (‘portfolio 
investments’).17  Member States have an obligation under Article 63 of the TFEU to refrain 
from adopting measures infringing the free movement of capital.  Since the Directive allows 
for the creation of obstacles to takeovers under the optionality and reciprocity provisions in 
Article 12, it is unlikely that it acts as a defence for the breach of Member State’s obligation 
under Article 63 TFEU. 
 The second section of this paper explores the need to harmonise takeovers and capital 
movement, considering the three levels of tension inherent in the Directive: the choice 
                                                 
11
 M. Gatti, “Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive” (2005) 6 
European Business Organization Law Review 553, 567. 
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 European Commission, “Report on the implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids” (Brussels, 21 
February 2007) SEC(2007) 268, paragraph 3. 
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 Recital 1, Directive 2004/25/EC [2004] OJ L142/12. 
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 Rectal 3, Directive 2004/25/EC [2004] OJ L142/12. 
15
 N. Moloney, “Financial Market Regulation in the Post-Financial Services Action Plan era” (2006) 55 
International Comparative Law Quarterly 982, 983. 
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 D.A. Wyatt, “Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Freedoms and the Right to Equality after Viking and 
Mangold and the Implications for Community Competence” (2008) 4 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & 
Policy 1, 40; see also T. Papadopoulos, EU Law and the Harmonisation of Takeovers in the Internal Market 
(Kluwer Law International, 2010) 189. 
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 See Case C-222/97 Manfred Trummer and Peter Mayer [1999] ECR I-1661, para 21; Case C-483/99 
Commission v France [2002] ECR I-4781, para 36-37; Case C-98/01 Commission v United Kingdom [2003] 
ECR I-4641, para 39-40; Joined Cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v Netherlands [2006] ECR I-9141, 
para 19); see also W.G. Ringe, “Is Volkswagen the new Centros? Free movement of capital’s impact on 
company law” in D. Prentice and A. Reisberg, Corporate Finance Law in the UK and EU (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 465. 
between permissive and prescriptive rules, minimum and exhaustive harmonisation measures, 
and optional and mandatory rules.   The third section of this paper considers the extent to 
which the tension could be resolved by negative integration – looking at the jurisprudence of 
the Court and arguing that the Court is likely to find Member States that have applied Article 
12 of the Directive in breach of their obligation under Article 63 TFEU.  The fourth section 
of this paper looks at alternative means of harmonising takeovers and capital movement other 
than by negative integration and cautions against a strict negative integration approach, given 
the uncertainty of the political will in Member States to eliminate takeover obstacles and the 
uncertainty of the economic situation in the EU. 
 
The tension between takeovers and capital movement 
 
Whilst Article 63 TFEU prohibits obstacles to capital movement,
18
 supplemented by the 
board neutrality rule of Article 9 of the Directive that precludes directors from frustrating 
takeover bids,
19
 Article 12 of the Directive makes the removal of obstacles that would 
frustrate takeover bids optional.
20
  It is argued here that Article 12 of the Directive creates a 
tension between takeovers and capital movement, which occurs on three levels.  Firstly, there 
is tension created by the choice between prescriptive rules and permissive rules.  Secondly, 
there is tension created by the choice between minimum and exhaustive harmonisation.  
Thirdly, there is tension created by the choice between optional rules and mandatory rules.  
All three levels of tension between takeovers and capital movement are discussed in turn. 
 As regards the tension created by the choice between prescriptive and permissive 
rules, one of the objectives of the Directive is legal certainty on the conduct of takeover bids 
and community-wide clarity and transparency in respect of takeover bids.
21
  It should 
therefore follow that rules adopted should create legal certainty for takeovers.  On the one 
hand, ‘without legal certainty, without reliable information, without clear framework rules, 
markets cannot work for long’, and on the other hand, it ‘is economic freedom that lets 
markets best play their role – legislation has to help, not hinder, this process.’22  The question 
is whether, to achieve the objective of legal certainty, takeovers are best regulated under 
company law, which tends to be prescriptive, or under capital markets law,
23
 which tends to 
be permissive.    
 Whereas takeovers belong to securities regulation in most Member States, the EU 
deals with takeovers under company law.
24
  Furthermore, while the Directive relates to 
company law and its harmonisation process, it also seeks to regulate an important element of 
the functioning of capital markets: the public bid for all the shares of a company. This is 
unproblematic, except when capital markets law imposes substantial corporate governance 
                                                 
18
 Article 63(1) TFEU states: “Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on 
the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be 
prohibited.” 
19
 Article 9(2) of the Directive provides: “…the board of the offeree company shall obtain the prior 
authorisation of the general meeting of shareholders given for this purpose before taking any action, other than 
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 Article 12(1) of the Directive provides: “Member States may reserve the right not to require companies as 
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21
 European Commission, Report on the application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids (Brussels, 28 
June 2012) COM(2012) 347 final, paragraph 1.3. 
22
 C. McCreevy, “The Commission’s Financial Services Policy 2005-2010” (2005) Exchange of Views on 
Financial Services Policy 2005-2010 Conference, Brussels, 18 July 2005. 
23
 Capital markets law also refers to securities regulation, which terms are often used interchangeably. 
24
 E. Wymeersch, “About techniques of regulating companies in the EU” in G. Ferrarini (ed), Reforming 
company and takeover law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 150. 
rules on all companies accessing its market.
25
  It is therefore argued that Article 9 of the 
Directive is a typical company law measure, which strikes at the heart of the diverse 
corporate governance structures in the EU, but simultaneously imposes a prescriptive 
requirement of Board neutrality during any bid on an important capital markets law element 
of regulation of public takeover bids.  This is an imposition which most Member States see as 
a measure beyond the confines of their understanding of capital markets law. 
 The use of company law and capital markets law in the Directive is problematic.  
Whereas the EU deals with takeovers as part of company law and to that extent applies 
prescriptive rules under Article 9 of the Directive, it also applies a capital markets law 
permissive approach in making Article 9 optional under Article 12.  The permissive rule of 
Article 12 was reached as a compromise due to the varied corporate structures across the EU, 
especially as takeovers belong to capital markets law in most Member States.  For example, 
Germany with its highly concentrated share-ownership structures found no room for Article 9 
of the Directive.  In fact, it opposed the draft Directive in 2001 by threatening not to back the 
Directive ‘unless shareholder approval for frustrating action were eliminated from Article 9 
or the entire article were removed from the Directive’.26  In a 273-273-tie vote on 4 July 2001 
a German MEP-led coalition in the European Parliament rejected a text that was heavily 
influenced by the UK’s City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.27  In the UK, takeovers belong 
to company law and apply the prescriptive rule of board neutrality, which most Member 
States do not welcome. 
 The diverse equity markets in the EU, with dispersed and concentrated ownership 
structures, make the policing of takeovers by prescriptive rules of company law difficult.  In 
such social markets, with concentrated ownership structures, takeovers hardly thrive.  In 
concentrated ownership markets, management often have a close relationship with 
shareholders or own substantial numbers of shares; this means it is easy for them to dissuade 
shareholders from tendering their shares. As a result, David Hahn observes that management 
would be likely to persuade large stable shareholders not to tender their shares to outside 
bidders.
28
  As observed by Hahn, Germany, France and Italy are concentrated ownership 
markets with less developed equity markets,
29
 while the UK has a well-developed liquid 
equity market, with more corporations listed per capita than in any other country.
30
  
Takeovers thrive in dispersed ownership markets like the UK, as does the prescriptive rule of 
Board neutrality.  With the EU’s diverse equity market structures, it is no wonder that 
agreeing on a prescriptive rule for Article 9 of the Directive proved to be such an arduous 
task until a permissive Article 12 was agreed. 
 It is argued here that to achieve legal certainty prescriptive rules are necessary.  The 
question then is how to apply a prescriptive approach of company law to a Directive which 
itself implicitly admits a permissive approach of capital markets law by virtue of Article 12 
of the Directive.  One answer to this question is to appeal to the jurisprudence of the Court.  
In its broader jurisprudence, the Court regards EU treaties as having the effect of limiting 
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 J. Winter, “EU Company Law at the cross-roads” in G. Ferrarini (ed), Reforming company and takeover law 
in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 12. 
26
 K.J. Hopt, “Takeover regulation in Europe – The battle for the 13th directive on takeovers” (2002) 15 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1, 10. 
27
 M. Gatti, “Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive” (2005) 6 
European Business Organization Law Review 553, 561. 
28
 D. Hahn, “Concentrated ownership and control of corporate reorganisations” (2004) Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 117, 129. 
29
 D. Hahn, “Concentrated ownership and control of corporate reorganisations” (2004) Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 117, 132. 
30
 D. Hahn, “Concentrated ownership and control of corporate reorganisations” (2004) Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 117, 134. 
Member States’ ‘sovereign rights’ and creating ‘a body of law which binds’ Member States 
and ‘their nationals’.31  In its specific case law on takeovers, the Court has shown through the 
golden shares cases that certain measures in share dealings can restrict the free movement of 
capital under the TFEU.
32
  This calls for an analysis of how opting out of Article 9 of the 
Directive might be interpreted as a restriction on the free movement of capital and a breach of 
Article 63 TFEU.  First, though, it is necessary to consider the second level of tension 
between takeovers and capital movement rules, i.e. the tension created by the choice between 
minimum and exhaustive harmonisation.   
One of the objectives of the Directive is to facilitate takeover bids by ensuring the 
freedom to deal in and vote on the securities of companies and to prevent operations which 
could frustrate a bid.
33
  The Directive requires takeover rules to help shareholders to deal in 
and vote on the securities of a company and for management to be neutral during a takeover 
bid.  Reinforcing such shareholder freedom to deal in and vote on securities across the EU, 
involves a choice between minimum and exhaustive harmonisation. Takeovers are at the 
heart of the internal market.  Certainly, minimum harmonisation is not appropriate for areas 
that are at the heart of the internal market.
34
  However, since the Directive was adopted as a 
minimum harmonisation measure,
35
 this choice creates tension between takeovers and capital 
movement, in the context of the internal market. 
 Since EU law is by definition supranational, harmonisation is one of its raisons 
d’etre.36 Thus, it is argued here that, with hindsight, minimum harmonisation was not the best 
way to adopt the Directive, especially given the need to align it with the free movement of 
capital.  With diverse corporate structures, dispersed and concentrated ownership structures, 
it is difficult to have rules that will appeal to all Member States.  For example, the mandatory 
bid rule impedes the takeover of a typical German company, with its controlling owner, but 
not that of a typical UK company, with its dispersed ownership.
37
  The mandatory bid rule 
would have brought a gloss of exhaustive harmonisation across the EU, if it were not for the 
wide range of national derogations.
38
  Whilst the Directive had envisioned making takeover 
safeguards uniform throughout the Union,
39
 exhaustive harmonisation would have secured 
equivalent safeguards and a mandatory Article 9 would have met the objective of reinforcing 
the freedom to deal in and vote on securities.  Unfortunately, the diverse corporate structures 
meant the Directive was adopted as a harmonisation measure. 
 Adopting the Directive as a harmonisation measure was bound to fail to harmonise 
takeovers and align them with capital movement in the internal market; to that extent the 
Directive hardly achieved any harmonisation.  Perhaps it is this mismatch of the choice 
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 European Commission, “Report on the application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids” (Brussels, 28 
June 2012) COM(2012) 347 final, paragraph 3. 
34
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 European Commission, “Report on the application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids” (Brussels, 28 
June 2012) COM(2012) 347 final, paragraph 2. 
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2004) 737, 744. 
37
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 European Commission, “Report on the application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids” (Brussels, 28 
June 2012) COM(2012) 347 final, paragraph 17. 
39
 Recital 1, Directive 2004/25/EC [2004] OJ L142/12. 
between minimum and exhaustive harmonisation measures that led to the conclusion that 
most EU ‘corporate law rules can be categorised as optional, market-mimicking, unimportant 
or avoidable’.40  Minimum harmonisation creates a tension between takeovers and capital 
movement.  This perhaps explains why, in its review of the implementation of the Directive, 
the Commission found that ‘a large number of Member States has shown strong reluctance to 
lift takeover barriers,’ and by applying Article 12 of the Directive, the Commission observed 
that ‘the number of Member States implementing the Directive in a seemingly protectionist 
way is unexpectedly large.’41 
 The tension created by the choice between optional rules and mandatory rules also 
needs careful consideration.  One of the objectives of the Directive is to reinforce the single 
market by enabling the free movement of capital throughout the EU.
42
  One way of 
reinforcing the single market as an area without internal frontiers in which free movement of 
capital is ensured
43
 is to facilitate corporate restructuring by regulating takeovers.  This 
requires takeover rules to be in harmony with movement of capital rules, so as to prevent 
frustrating takeover bids and to facilitate the free flow of capital.  While the free movement 
of capital is one of the fundamental freedoms laid down in the TFEU
44
 and in this context a 
mandatory rule, reinforced by the board neutrality rule of Article 9 of the Directive, it is 
rendered illusory by the optionality provision in Article 12 of the Directive.  Since some 
Member States have opted to apply Article 12 of the Directive, while other Member States 
have not done so, this not only creates tension of rules across the EU but also creates 
‘discrimination with respect to defensive measures against hostile takeovers.’45  The 
argument here is that to reinforce the single market aims takeovers are best regulated by 
mandatory rules rather than optional rules. 
 The question is whether Article 12, which reduces what would have been a mandatory 
measure of Article 9 of the Directive to an optional measure, can be applied or interpreted to 
conform to Article 63 TFEU.  This leads to the question of whether Article 63 TFEU has a 
direct effect such that the optional provision of Article 12 of the Directive could be bypassed.  
The Court historically construed the earlier version of Article 63 TFEU on free movement of 
capital, Ex Article 67 EEC, as only effective ‘to the extent necessary to ensure the proper 
functioning of the common market’.46 By then, Ex Article 67 EEC had not abolished all 
restrictions to free movement of capital.  In reinforcing the single market, the abolition of all 
restrictions to free movement of capital was introduced by secondary legislation under 
Directive 88/361.
47
  This was later adopted thanks to an amendment to the primary 
legislation, now contained in Article 63 TFEU, which the Court has held to have direct 
effect.
48
  It is argued here that the mandatory nature of Article 63 TFEU requires mandatory 
takeover rules in order to harmonise takeovers with the free movement of capital.  It is further 
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argued that in cases where Article 12 of the Directive is not in harmony with Article 63 
TFEU, the latter should prevail. 
  As one of the objectives of regulating takeovers is to reinforce the single market by 
enabling the free movement of capital throughout the EU, it is important that any secondary 
legislation is not applied in a manner that trumps the provisions of primary legislation.  The 
Directive facilitates the free movement of capital if the Directive removes all restrictions to 
the acquisition of shares in the process of corporate restructuring in the EU.  To the extent 
that Article 63 TFEU has this direct effect,
49
 it can arguably be invoked independent of the 
Directive.  As such, a measure that is allowed in secondary legislation, the Directive, can be 
found to be in violation of Article 63 TFEU.  Contrary to the single market aim, opting to 
frustrate takeover bids by virtue of Article 12 of the Directive would be a breach of Article 63 
TFEU, if Article 12 of the Directive is construed as (a) a State measure, which (b) restricts or 
renders illusory the free movement of capital, and (c) the State has no justification under EU 
law to so restrict. 
 This all assumes that the acquisition of shares is movement of capital.  Whilst what 
amounts to movement of capital is not defined in the TFEU, it is certainly not to be construed 
literally as in filling a car with money and moving it across the border.
50
  In defining what 
capital is, the Court adopted the definition contained in the annex to Directive 88/361, and 
held that acquisition of shares on the capital market for the purpose of a financial investment 
constitutes movement of capital,
51
 and, further, that the resale of shares to the issuing 
company constitutes movement of capital.
52
  As such, the application of Article 63 is broad 
enough to cover all kinds of investments by both natural and legal persons, and includes 
shares or any form of share capital.
53
  Article 12 of the Directive violates Article 63 TFEU to 
the extent that it restricts cross-border acquisitions.  Thus, it would be a violation of EU law 
if companies from one Member State were prohibited from buying the shares of a company 
in another Member State.
54
 
 Article 9 of the Directive seeks to reinforce the single market by outlawing internal 
obstacles to the free movement of capital in the form of share acquisitions.  Paradoxically, the 
Directive is a secondary legislation duly enacted by EU institutions. Nevertheless, its optional 
provision is at odds with the mandatory provision of Article 63 TFEU, which creates 
uncertainty in the legal situation of its Member States.  However, Member States would not 
be justified in restricting capital movement by virtue of Article 12 of the Directive.  The 
Court has ruled that it is not possible to justify a failure to fulfil an obligation by invoking the 
uncertainty of the legal situation in which the Member State finds itself, and against which 
the Treaty affords it means of action.
55
  In an analogous case that concerned the free 
movement of goods, the Court said that it is ‘not for the Community institutions to act in 
place of the Member States and to prescribe for them the measures which they must adopt in 
order to safeguard the free movement of goods.’56  As such, the Court is likely to find that 
notwithstanding Article 12 of the Directive, Member States ought to adopt measures that 
effectively safeguard the free movement of capital.  It is for the Member States to resolve the 
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conflict between the mandatory Article 63 TFEU and the optional Article 12 of the Directive 
by refraining from applying the latter. 
 
Negative integration of takeovers and capital movement 
 
Appealing to the jurisprudence of the Court is here suggested as one means of ensuring that 
there will be legal integration of takeovers and capital movement so as to avoid any apparent 
tension.  This is based on the understanding that, negative integration, striking down by the 
Court of national barriers to cross-border business activity, has become more influential.
57
 
 Paul Davies and colleagues observed that it is politically impossible, for the 
Commission to challenge decisions made by Member States by taking up options explicitly 
provided for in the Takeover Directive.
58
  However, they also noted that any association 
between choices under the Directive and economic nationalism can be tested indirectly by 
looking at Commission challenges to non-takeover but related national legislation on the 
ground that it infringes either or both of the Treaty provisions on free movement of capital 
and freedom of establishment within the EU.
59
  In these situations, according to Davies and 
colleagues, the Commission would be explicitly acting to protect the interests of acquirers 
from other Member States.
60
  Relying on the jurisprudence of the Court, this paper assesses 
the potential infringement of Article 63 TFEU given the choices of Member States. 
Gerard Hertig and Joseph McCahery observe that the shift from a mandatory towards 
a legal options oriented approach probably reflects opportunistic considerations.
61
 They point 
out that the repeated failures in getting the Directive adopted and the need to finally show 
some results (regardless of their substance) paved the way for what many observers 
considered to be a desperate one-off move. They further observe that, ‘the EC probably also 
hoped to thus reignite support for (mandate-oriented) EU corporate law-making by those 
Member States likely to suffer from emerging regulatory arbitrage and competition.’62   What 
needs to be highlighted here is the significance of assessing, in regard to the Directive, one of 
the arguments Hertig and McCahery make, which states that ‘the use of options should 
permit the EC and Member States to limit the risk of disruptive ECJ intrusions in the 
company lawmaking process.’63 
 The question is whether the intrusion of the Court can be limited where the Directive 
defeats the aim of establishing a single market under the Treaty. The Directive is meant to 
reinforce the single market by enabling the free movement of capital throughout the EU.  
However, the lawmaking process that shifted from mandatory provisions to optional 
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provision of Article 12 of the Directive hardly reinforces the single market, for it simply 
entrenches the diverse corporate cultures that existed in the EU prior to the Directive.  The 
Court has said that, ‘the Treaty, by establishing a common market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies of the Member States, seeks to unite national markets 
into a single market having the characteristics of a domestic market.’64  Rather than limit the 
intrusion of the Court, the shift from mandatory to optional provisions in the Directive, 
creating tension between takeovers and capital movement, invites the intrusion of the Court 
to align the two. 
 The Court has defined the concept of a common market as involving ‘the elimination 
of all obstacles to intra-Community trade in order to merge the national markets into a single 
market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market.’65  
With the Treaty requiring the abolition of obstacles to free movement of capital in order to 
create a single market, it is difficult to see how the Court would not find objectionable Article 
12 of the Directive that makes the abolition of those obstacles optional.  Negative integration 
can be used to align takeovers with free movement of capital, as the Court is likely to find 
that a Member State that applies Article 12 of the Directive infringes Article 63 TFEU. This 
is because Article 12 has the effect of restricting takeovers and to that extent ‘dissuade 
investors in other Member States from investing in the capital of those undertakings’, 
rendering ‘the free movement of capital illusory’, and therefore constituting ‘a restriction on 
movements of capital’.66 
 In finding whether a Member State is in breach of Article 63 TFEU, two models are 
usually applied: the ‘non-discrimination model’ and the ‘no-restriction model.’67 This is not 
ideal since the non-discrimination model is difficult to defend as it either violates the no-
restriction model by justifying a restriction if it is not ‘substantial’ or adopts the approach 
sometimes taken by the Court in relation to other freedoms.  The court has made it clear in a 
number of decisions that breach of Article 63 TFEU does not depend on discrimination.
68
  
Article 63 TFEU prohibits not only discriminatory or particularly restrictive treatment of 
nationals of other Member States, but every restriction of cross-border transfer of capital.
69
  
For this reason, the requirement of the free movement of capital is infringed if the measure 
applies equally but dissuades investors from other Member States.
70
  Hence, it would appear 
that the Court applies the non-restrictive model in finding whether there is a breach of Article 
63 TFEU. 
 Although Article 63 TFEU and Article 9 of the Directive use different terminologies, 
prohibiting ‘restrictions’ and ‘obstacles’ respectively, this does not challenge the harmony 
required between the two.  The Court uses both terminologies interchangeably.  For example, 
in Commission v Netherlands,
71
 the court referred to both ‘restrictions’ and ‘obstacles’ to free 
movement of capital and referred to an ‘obstacle to the movement of capital’ in Sandoz.72  In 
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such a case, any ‘obstacle’ to takeovers will amount to a ‘restriction’ contrary to Article 63 
TFEU.  Such restriction to movement of capital need not be substantial; it suffices that it 
‘dissuades investors in other Member States from investing’, and it is irrelevant that the 
measure does ‘not give rise to unequal treatment.’73  Where a Member State has opted out of 
Article 9 of the Directive, ‘if the management uses defensive mechanisms this could be either 
a direct barrier to the acquisition of shares but also a restriction of shareholder rights which 
make the investment into the company less attractive.’74  It is irrelevant that the measure 
applies equally to domestic and to foreign investors. Provided the measures are liable to 
render free movement of capital illusory, which may make the investment into the company 
less attractive, it will constitute a breach of Article 63 TFEU. 
 It is not easy for a Member State to justify a breach of Article 63 TFEU.  In 
Commission v Portugal,
75
 the Court decided that a restriction to free movement of capital can 
be justified if (a) overriding requirements of general interest apply; or (b) express derogations 
in Article 65 TFEU (Ex Article 58) apply, and the measure accords with the principle of 
proportionality.  Article 65 TFEU derogations essentially apply on the basis of taxation and 
public policy or security. These are difficult to invoke when a Member State wishes to 
restrict free movement of capital.  The Court interprets these derogations very strictly.
76
  As 
such, in derogations affecting takeovers, the ostensible ground for any such derogation would 
take the form of economic protection.  The Court has, however, ruled that these derogations 
cannot be applied to serve purely economic ends.
77
  In Commission v Portugal the court said 
that ‘economic grounds can never serve as justification for obstacles prohibited by the 
Treaty’.78  A Member State would find it difficult to successfully raise justification for breach 
of Article 63 TFEU. 
 The Takeover Directive is a product of over thirty years of political haggling.  The 
resulting ‘Thirteenth Directive’ was a compromise with many options, choices and much 
discretion for the Member States.
79
 The effects of disagreements and political compromises 
are reflected in Article 12, which was enshrined into the Directive. The question is whether 
the Court should take into account the long history of the Directive if called upon to decide 
on the implications of Article 12.  It is argued here that the Court should not be bound to 
consider any underlying political compromises. The language of Article 63 TFEU and the 
line of consistent Court decisions are uncompromising.  One can only speculate that, had 
Member States applying Article 12 of the Directive known that such an option would not 
limit the Court’s intrusion, they might have voted differently in order to defeat the adoption 
of the Directive. It is argued here that the optional choice of lawmaking seen in Article 12 of 
the Directive does not limit the intrusion of the Court to further promote the single market 
concept. This is assessed in light of the Court’s decisions in the ‘golden share’ cases,80 which, 
together with other Court cases, are worth reviewing. 
                                                 
73
 Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731 para 45. 
74
 M. Andenas, T. Gutt and M. Pannier, “Free movement of capital and national company law” (2005) 16 
European Business Law Review 757, 778. 
75
 Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731. 
76
 see Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister of the Interior [1975] ECR 1219 para 26/27. 
77
 Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister of the Interior [1975] ECR 1219 para 30. 
78
 Case C-367/98 [2002] ECR I-4731 para 52. 
79
 J. Armour and W.G. Ringe, “European Company Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and Crisis” (2011) ECGI Law 
Working Paper Number 175, paragraph 4.3. 
80
 For context, a ‘golden share’ is a term used to denote a special share held by the State in a privatised 
company, which is usually held for the purpose of protecting the company from being subject to a takeover.  A 
golden share is like a poison pill in regard to takeovers, for it gives the State power to restrict acquisition of 
shares in a company, making it difficult for hostile takeovers.  It is to the extent of this restrictive power that the 
Court found golden shares objectionable as being contrary to both freedom of establishment and free movement 
of capital. 
 In 2000, in Commission v Italy,
81
 the first golden shares case, the Court ruled that 
Italy was in breach of its Treaty obligation on free movement of capital by adopting special 
rights in the shares of companies in the energy and telecommunications sectors.  It was no 
defence that the measures adopted by the Italian government had been pursuant to secondary 
EU law in the decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 4 May 1999 (GURI 
1999, No 109) and that these had been communicated to the Commission.  The Commission 
had argued that the special shareholding powers allowed by the President of the Council of 
Ministers were liable to hinder or render less attractive the exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, unless they were justified, and the Commission 
considered that those special powers were incompatible with the Treaty.  What this case 
demonstrates is that it is no defence for breach of Treaty obligation to refer to secondary EU 
law.  Therefore, Member States applying Article 12 of the Directive would not find it a 
defence for breach of Article 63 TFEU. 
 In 2002, in three golden share cases in Commission v Portugal,
82
 Commission v 
France,
83
 and Commission v Belgium,
84
 the Court found the Portuguese, French and Belgian 
golden share arrangements to be unlawful and contrary to Article 63 TFEU.  In the 
Portuguese companies, the golden shareholding accorded the State power to limit 
participation by non-nationals and to establish a procedure for the grant of prior authorisation 
by the Minister of Finance once the interest of a person acquiring shares in a privatised 
company exceeded a ceiling of 10 per cent. In the French company (Société Nationale Elf-
Aquitaine), the golden shareholding accorded the State power to approve in advance any 
acquisition of shares or rights that exceeded established limits on the holding of capital and to 
oppose decisions to transfer shares or use them as security. 
 The Court concluded that legislation which is liable to impede the acquisition of 
shares in the undertakings concerned, and dissuade investors in other Member States from 
investing in the capital of those undertakings, may render the free movement of capital 
illusory, and it thus constituted a restriction on movements of capital.  In the case of Belgium, 
the Court found that, by maintaining in force the national provisions vesting in the Belgian 
State a golden share in Société Nationale de Transport par Canalisations, which carried 
special rights, including appointing two representatives of the Federal Government to the 
board of directors of the company who had power to annul any decision by the board of 
directors, the Belgian State was in breach of its Treaty obligation on free movement of 
capital. Conversely, a Member State that applies Article 12 of the Directive thereby retains 
obstacles or restrictions to takeover bids and to that extent dissuades investors in other 
Member States from investing in the capital of undertakings situated in that Member State. In 
so doing, the Member State would be in breach of its Treaty obligation on the free movement 
of capital. 
 In 2003 in two golden share cases, Commission v Spain
85
 and Commission v United 
Kingdom,
86
 the Court found that the golden share arrangements applicable to the 
undertakings in Spanish companies (Repsol, Telefónica, Argentaria, Tabacalera, Endesa) and 
a British company (British Airports Authority (BAA)) were contrary to the principle of the 
free movement of capital.  In the Spanish companies, the golden share meant that the State 
had the power to restrict and approve certain decisions, including mergers or change of 
corporate objects or the disposal of certain assets or shareholdings in those companies.  In the 
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British company, BAA, the golden shares created power for the State to restrict and approve 
certain decisions, including the disposal of an airport and the acquisition of more than 15 per 
cent of the voting shares in a company. 
 In the Court’s view, investments in the form of participations, constituted movements 
of capital under EU legislation.  On that basis, the Court found that both the Spanish and the 
UK golden share rules entailed restrictions on the free movement of capital between Member 
States.  Although Member States can justify restrictions in limited circumstances under the 
Treaty, the Court found that the restrictions failed the test of proportionality, i.e. the 
restrictions went beyond what was necessary in order to attain the objective they pursued.  
Member States applying Article 12 are unlikely to find justification for infringing Article 63 
TFEU. 
 In 2005, in Commission v Italy,
87
 although the case was not per se a golden share 
case, it concerned an Italian Decree-Law No 192/2001, the effect of which was contrary to 
Article 63 TFEU. The Decree-Law, insofar as it was concerned solely with public 
undertakings, was designed to exclude State influence but had a proviso for the automatic 
suspension of voting rights attaching to holdings in excess of 2% of the capital of 
undertakings operating in the electricity and gas sectors.  This proviso, the Italian 
Government unsuccessfully argued, was to safeguard the supply of energy within Italian 
territory.  The Court found that the suspension of voting rights meant that the category of 
public undertakings concerned was precluded from participating effectively in the 
management and control of Italian undertakings operating in the electricity and gas markets, 
which, in turn, had the effect of dissuading public undertakings established in other Member 
States from acquiring shares in Italian undertakings operating in the energy sector, contrary 
to Article 63 TFEU.  This case demonstrates that the Court is likely to rule that application of 
Article 12 of the Directive has the effect of dissuading undertakings established in other 
Member States from acquiring shares in a Member State which has opted into Article 12 and 
thereby retained takeover obstacles. 
 In 2007 in Commission v Germany,
88
 a case that is not a classic golden share case but 
one which has a restrictive State measure, the Court held that by maintaining in force certain 
provisions or State measures in the Volkswagen Law (VW Law), Germany had failed to fulfil 
its obligations under Article 56(1) EC (now Article 63(1) TFEU).  The provisions of the VW 
Law gave the Federal State and the Land of Lower Saxony the ability to exercise a greater 
level of influence than would normally be linked to their investment.  The Commission 
successfully argued that various disputed provisions of the VW Law were likely to deter 
direct investment: limiting the voting rights of every shareholder to 20% of Volkswagen’s 
share capital; requiring a majority of over 80% of the shares represented for resolutions of the 
general assembly, allowing the Federal State and the Land of Lower Saxony each to appoint 
two representatives to the company’s supervisory board. It concluded that all of these actions 
would be contrary to the general law so would constitute restrictions on the free movement of 
capital within the meaning of now Article 63 TFEU.  The Court agreed with the Commission.  
This case therefore demonstrated that any State measure which included measures adopted 
pursuant to Article 12 of the Directive which might deter direct investment would constitute a 
restriction on the free movement of capital within the meaning of what is now Article 63 
TFEU. 
 In 2010, in Commission v Portugal,
89
 the Court ruled that by maintaining special 
rights in Portugal Telecom allocated in connection with the State’s golden shares, the 
Portuguese Republic had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 56 EC (now Article 63 
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TFEU).  In this case, golden shares had been acquired legitimately under Portuguese national 
law under Article 15(3) of the Framework Law on Privatisations (Lei Quadro das 
Privatizaçoes) of 5 April 1990, which provided for the possibility of creating golden shares; 
nevertheless, national law was no defence to a breach of Article 63 TFEU.  In reference to the 
Directive, it is argued here that any national law that applies Article 12 of the Directive in a 
manner resulting in that Member State failing to fulfil its obligation under Article 63 TFEU 
would not be a defence. 
 A review of the above cases clearly suggests that Article 12 of the Directive is very 
likely to ‘dissuade investors’ from investing in the capital of those companies.90  To that 
extent, such optionality would be contrary to Article 63 TFEU by which Member States have 
the obligation to ensure that companies under their jurisdiction comply.  As such, a Member 
State that has applied Article 12 of the Directive is very likely, in the light of the golden share 
cases, to be found infringing Article 63 TFEU. Article 12 of the Directive does not limit but 
rather invites the intrusion of the Court to align takeovers to free movement of capital. 
 Negative integration would have been more effective by the use of Article 263 TFEU 
but for the missed opportunity.  The point being argued here is Article 12 of the Directive 
would have been subject to annulment if the matter had been brought to the Court. This 
would have been based on the principle that EU institutions cannot avoid judicial review of 
whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, 
the Treaty.
91
 All acts of institutions ‘must be open to judicial review’,92 and a legal action 
must be available for ‘all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, 
which are intended to have legal effect.’93 Where actions for annulment are brought in time 
the Court has shown its willingness to annul secondary legislations in part or in entirety.
94
 
 As it is too late for action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, the option now is 
for Article 12 of the Directive to be read in conformity with Article 63 TFEU, or to the extent 
that it does not conform, to be declared incompatible with Article 63 TFEU. The Commission 
could litigate for infringement of Article 63 TFEU. Perhaps in the current economic situation, 
there is no incentive for the Commission to litigate infringement of Article 63 TFEU on the 
basis of application of Article 12 of the Directive. In the drafting stages of the Directive, the 
Commission resisted making Article 9 optional but it now seems to accept the situation, 
concluding that ‘it does not seem appropriate at this stage to propose to make the optional 
articles of the Directive mandatory.’95 Nevertheless, it does not negate the legal analysis 
herein that the optional Article 12 of the Directive contravenes the mandatory Article 63 
TFEU. 
 The alternative would be for the affected participants to bring an action before their 
national courts for infringement of Article 63 TFEU. Like any other form of TFEU 
freedoms,
96
 free movement of capital is directly applicable.
97
 In that case, private parties such 
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as potential bidders of a blocked takeover affected by how Member States have applied 
Article 12 of the Directive, would not need to seek legal redress by virtue of the Directive but 
they would be able to invoke a breach of Article 63 TFEU directly.  An action for breach of 
Article 63 TFEU before national courts might force a reference to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.  If the national courts refused to refer the matter to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union or ruled in a manner that still infringed Article 63 TFEU, such an 
outcome would make the State liable for infringement of EU law.  Infringement of EU law by 
the national authorities (which includes national courts), might then be brought before the 




Interaction of takeovers and capital by compromise 
 
The historical difficulties leading up to the adoption of the Directive have continued to 
hamper harmonising takeovers with the free movement of capital.  It is argued elsewhere that 
the difficulties were borne from the tension between the wider aim of achieving an integrated 
internal market for Europe and satisfying the unity of Member States with diverse corporate 
governance structures and cultures.
99
  Ben Pettet,
100
 commenting on these difficulties, 
suggested that there was probably a cultural antipathy in some countries to the idea of using 
the threat of a hostile bid as a spur to management, which might be why we commonly find 
their companies have elaborate and entrenched anti-takeover devices.
101
  These anti-takeover 
devices have the potential to dissuade investors. The Commission observed that these 
defences make takeovers more difficult or costly and they consequently entrench 
management and render companies immune to unfriendly raiders.
102
  The Directive has had 
no effect on the culture of takeover defences: a high number of mostly pre-bid defences are 
still used in Europe.
103
  In their study into the impact of the Directive’s optionality based on 
an analysis of the formal rules adopted pre- and post-transposition, Davies and colleagues 
found that there has been a significant shift away from bidder friendliness in the transposition 
process.
104
  The effect of Article 12 is clear: entrenched diverse corporate governance 
cultures in Europe continue to hamper harmonising of takeovers with capital movement. 
 As positive integration seems unable to resolve the tension between the Directive and 
the Treaty, and perhaps with the need for judicial self-restraint in resolving the tension 
through strict negative integration, it is a question of whether appropriate safeguards could be 
implemented in applying takeover defences by virtue of Article 12 of the Directive.  
Arguably, subject to appropriate safeguards, Boards should be able to take defensive 
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measures because as the officiating organisation they should know better than anyone else 
threatened by potential break-up and asset-stripping through hostile takeovers.
105
  The 
difficulty is that directors’ interests are often misaligned with that of the company and its 
stakeholders during takeovers. ‘Often their own performance and plans are brought into 
question and their own jobs are in jeopardy.  Their interest is in saving their jobs and 
reputation instead of maximising the value of the company for shareholders’.106  If the 
directors reasonably believe it to be for the good of the company and its future business to 
resist a takeover, then they should convince the shareholders of that and only take action 
against unwanted bids with the consent of shareholders.
107
  Article 9 effectively provides 
safeguards by placing the decision as to defensive measures in the hands of shareholders.  
Whilst there could be an economic benefit accruing to stakeholders in protecting them from 
asset strippers by allowing defensive measures via the Directive, such benefit does not 
resolve the tension between the Directive and the Treaty. 
 It is observed here that in light of the reluctance of Member States to opt into Article 
9 so as to eliminate takeover obstacles, coupled with the reluctance of the Commission to 
propose to make the optional articles of the Directive mandatory,
108
 it is unlikely that the 
harmonious interaction between takeovers and capital movement can be achieved by positive 
integration.  In their review report, the Commission concluded that with 19 Member States 
opting into Article 9 the board neutrality rule was ‘a relative success,’109 but in the same 
review report, the Commission found that 13 out of those 19 Member States also apply the 
reciprocity rule.
110
  These findings can hardly suggest ‘a relative success’, for the net number 
of Member States opting into and applying Article 9 is only six Member States.  Given that 
the 13 Member States that also opted into Article 12(3) (reciprocity) included the six 
founding Members of the Community (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands, it is suggested that the reluctance of the founding Members be taken as a 
signal that the Union is unwilling to reform Article 9 into a mandatory provision.  With 
positive integration unlikely, given the reluctance of the six founding Members of the 
Community to seek harmonious interaction between takeovers and the free movement of 
capital by negative integration, such action might risk ‘rocking the EU boat.’  As the 
Directive was adopted by compromise, it seems only realistic to sustain it by compromise. 
 It has already been argued that it would be legitimate to appeal to the jurisprudence of 
the Court, in order to bridge the conflict between Article 63 TFEU and Article 12 of the 
Directive, by way of negative integration. The problem with negative integration is that it 
risks rocking the boat of the fragile sphere of the harmonisation of capital markets and 
company law. This is because such an approach, though legitimate, is likely to be seen as 
coercive and achieving by the ‘back door’ what failed to be achieved in the positive 
integration process. For this reason, a negative integration approach would be a very weak 
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attempt at a solution. A more solid solution might be for the Commission to adopt an 
intentional partial approach to the procedure in Article 258 TFEU (Ex Article 226 TEC).  The 
question is whether such a solution would be legitimate. 
 The first paragraph of Article 258 TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers 
that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a 
reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its 
observations. The second paragraph of Article 258 TFEU provides that if the State concerned 
does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter 
may bring the matter before the Court. The partial approach to Article 258 TFEU or 
legitimate compromise would be a two-stage approach. 
 In the first stage, where there is evidence that a natural or legal person seeking to 
trade shares was being restricted contrary to their rights under Article 63 TFEU in Member 
States which have either opted out of Article 9 or opted into Article 9 and also opted to apply 
Article 12(3) (the reciprocity rule), the Commission should invoke the first paragraph of 
Article 258.  The underlying argument here is that opting out of Article 9 does not suspend or 
create an exception to the application of the general principle laid down in Article 3(c) of the 
Directive,
111
 to the effect that ‘the Board of an offeree company must act in the interests of 
the company as a whole and must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide 
on the merits of the bid.’  Therefore, opting out of Article 9 still leaves certain conduct caught 
by Article 3(c) prohibited by the Directive, which places the board in default of both Article 
3(c) and Article 63 TFEU.  On being alerted that a market participant has been restricted or 
dissuaded to invest by way of bidding for shares in those Member States, the Commission 
should ask the Member State to refrain from infringing Article 63 TFEU, and then give its 
reasoned opinion to the effect that the manner in which the Member State has implemented 
the Directive has led to the infringement of Article 63 TFEU. 
 On possible infringement of the free movement of capital, the Commission has 
continued to show zero tolerance for the use of golden shares. For example, in a press release 
of April 2012 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion under Article 258 asking Greece to 
refrain from the use of golden shares to comply with its Treaty obligations under Articles 49 
and 63 TFEU.
112
 Greece acquired golden shares in the Hellenic Telecommunication 
Organisation (OTE), whose golden shares granted the Greek government special rights, 
including the right to appoint half of the members on OTE governing bodies and a wide 
range of veto rights on corporate and business matters, all of which might dissuade investors 
from other Members States from increasing their investment in OTE. As previously 
discussed, golden shares have the effect of dissuading investors in other Member States from 
investing in a Member State with golden shares and applying Article 12 of the Directive 
would likewise have a dissuading effect, contrary to Article 63 TFEU, which would 
necessitate a reasoned opinion (as a matter of discretion for the Commission). 
 In the second stage, if the Member State concerned did not comply with the opinion 
given by the Commission within the period laid down by the Commission under the second 
paragraph of Article 258 TFEU, the Commission should consider whether to bring the matter 
before the Court and should exercise its discretion in favour of not litigating the matter.
113
  
The decision not to litigate, even where there is clear infringement of Article 63 TFEU, 
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would be within the practice and discretion of the Commission.   The practice of the 
Commission is to settle disputes by negotiation; and litigation is simply a part, sometimes 
inevitable but nevertheless generally a minor part, of this process.
114
 As to discretion, the 
Court has consistently held that the Commission is not bound to commence the proceedings 
provided for in Article 258 TFEU and that this discretion excludes the right for any party to 
require the Commission to litigate or adopt a specific position.
115
 
 So far, in order to refrain from pursuing a positive integration approach, the 
Commission has relied on the lack of economic evidence, suggesting that the manner the 
Directive has been implemented has had a negative impact.  In their June 2012 review report, 
the Commission observed that it is difficult to calculate the impact of the Directive on the 
economy, mainly because there have been few takeover bids in the EU since the transposition 
of the Directive, due to the economic situation in the EU following the financial crisis.
116
 It is 
partly due to this lack of economic evidence to justify changing the situation which made the 
Commission conclude that it was not appropriate to propose making the optional articles of 
the Directive mandatory.
117
 As for negative integration, the lack of economic evidence may 
serve to delay but not to defeat the invoking of Article 258 TFEU. The fact that the 
Commission would commence its action after a lengthy period of time would not have the 
effect of regularising a continuing contravention.
118
 In fact, whenever in future evidence 
becomes available that a Member State’s application of Article 12 of the Directive has had a 
negative impact as in infringing Article 63 TFEU, the Commission may bring an action under 
Article 258 TFEU. 
 Alternatively, as another compromise, the Commission could resort to a series of 
permissive measures in the form of recommendations in an attempt to reverse the reality and 
effect of diverse corporate cultures in the EU; this could include requiring Member States 
who have opted out of Article 9 to require their companies to read such opt-out in the context 
of both Article 3(c) of the Directive and Article 63 TFEU. This takes us back to the 
discussion on whether takeovers should be regulated under capital markets law or company 
law.  As noted above, whereas takeovers belong to securities regulation in most Member 
States, the EU deals with takeovers under company law.
119
 In the regulation of takeovers, the 
corporate culture of most Member States would welcome a permissive rules approach akin to 
securities regulation, rather than a prescriptive rules approach akin to company law.  
Nevertheless, legal certainty and aligning takeovers to free movement of capital requires 
prescriptive rules. However, with such entrenched diverse corporate cultures in the EU, 
seeking to secure the economic exchange of capital with prescriptive rules as opposed to 
permissive rules ignores the free and liberal nature of capital markets. With most Member 
States maintaining takeover obstacles by Article 12 of the Directive, a series of permissive 
rules approach could gradually reverse the defensive cultures as corporate cultures converge 
to achieve a single market. 
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 It is worth summing up the difficulties in taking a strict legal approach in seeking to 
align takeovers to free movement of capital.  Firstly, the difficulties partly lie in the 
Directive’s aim of introducing into Member States the corporate cultures of other Member 
States.
120
  Whilst the UK on which the Directive was modelled with its dispersed 
shareholding structures is accustomed to the idea of hostile takeovers, most economies of 
Europe have concentrated shareholding structures that are usually unfavourable to takeovers.  
Secondly, the perception has long existed that the prescriptive controversial provision, the 
board neutrality rule, which was mainly influenced by the UK, was designed to break down 
the laws of Germany, the Netherlands and other continental European countries which were 
hostile to takeovers.
121
  Thirdly, national interests are still stronger than EU interests.  For 
example, in its review of the implementation of the Directive, the Commission found that ‘a 
large number of Member States has shown strong reluctance to lift takeover barriers’; by 
applying Article 12 of the Directive, the Commission observed that ‘the number of Member 
States implementing the Directive in a seemingly protectionist way is unexpectedly large.’122  
Fourthly, there have been few takeover bids since the transposition of the Directive due to the 
economic situation in the EU following the financial crisis.
123
 As a result, a more cautious 
approach should be taken in applying a strict legal approach to takeovers, given the fragile 
economic situation at a time when EU regulators are struggling to place business operations 
on a more secure basis. With all these odds, interaction between takeovers and capital 
movement may better be gained with a realistic compromise solution which applies a series 
of permissive rules to gradually reverse takeover obstacles across the EU. 
 
A way forward and concluding remarks 
 
The way forward in resolving the tension between Article 12 of the Directive and Article 63 
TFEU raises the question whether law reform is the appropriate answer. The core provisions 
of the Directive, if not subject to opt-out arrangements, would have improved conditions for 
takeovers in the internal market by preventing at least some self-serving defensive measures 
from company boards.
124
 Due to the lack of economic evidence to justify changing the 
situation, the Commission concluded that it was not appropriate to propose to make the 
optional articles of the Directive mandatory.
125
 In the words of Jaap Winter, ‘a key challenge 
of regulation (…) is to distinguish which problems can be meaningfully addressed by new 
regulation and which problems cannot. A bigger challenge still is to act on this distinction 
and to have the courage not to regulate the latter problems but to seek different avenues of 
addressing them’.126 With the lack of political willingness and the economic protectionism in 
some Member States, it is better to seek to enforce Article 63 TFEU than to reform takeover 
law. Seeking to enforce existing EU law would be less challenging than to turn to 
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protectionist and unwilling Member States seeking a legal mandate for a takeover law 
reform. 
In conclusion, this paper noted that the February 2007 and June 2012 Commission 
reports on the implementation of the Directive highlighted a number of problems in the 
context of aligning takeovers with the aims of a single market with a particular focus on 
enabling the free movement of capital throughout the EU. This paper critically examined how 
a number of choices, ranging from regulating takeovers by prescriptive or permissive rules by 
minimum or exhaustive measures to mandatory or optional rules, creates significant tension 
between takeovers and capital movement. In the context of aligning takeovers with capital 
movement rules, this paper made a number of observations. Firstly, the prescriptive rule in 
Article 9 is weakened by the permissive rule in Article 12, which in turn creates tension 
between takeovers and the free movement of capital. Secondly, the minimum measure in the 
Directive, allowing for a varied application of the core provisions, entrenches national 
interests above EU interests and creates tension between takeovers and the free movement of 
capital. Thirdly, optional rules in the Directive hardly reinforce the single market and leave 
Article 12 of the Directive at odds with mandatory provision of Article 63 TFEU. 
 Having concluded that positive integration seems to have failed to harmonise takeover 
rules to capital movement rules, this paper critically examined how the tension could be 
resolved by appealing to the jurisprudence of the Court. It discussed a number of Court 
decisions, including the so-called golden share cases, and concluded that Member States who 
have applied Article 12 of the Directive are likely to be found in breach of their obligation 
under Article 63 TFEU.  Due to the lack of political willingness on the part of Member States 
to eliminate takeover obstacles and the uncertainty of the economic situation in the EU, this 
paper suggested a pragmatic solution that avoids a strict negative integration approach, 
namely for the Commission to use its discretion in applying Article 258 TFEU and issue a 
series of permissive rules in order to reverse gradually the culture of takeover obstacles 
across the EU. 
